De texto de William Kristol, publicado no New York Times no dia 4 de fevereiro, um trecho em que ele coloca os valores pelos quais os conservadores se enxergariam no espelho. Responsabilidade, excelência, auto-sustento, "virtudes", todas coisas positivas. Mas que também como a igualdade, justiça etc... que a esquerda se vê, podem ser distorcidas por intolerância e ideologismos (sem falar da hipocrisia):
"The American conservative movement has been remarkably successful. We shouldn’t take that success for granted. It’s not easy being a conservative movement in a modern liberal democracy. It’s not easy to rally a comfortable and commercial people to assume the responsibilities of a great power. It’s not easy to defend excellence in an egalitarian age. It’s not easy to encourage self-reliance in the era of the welfare state. It’s not easy to make the case for the traditional virtues in the face of the seductions of liberation, or to speak of duties in a world of rights and of honor in a nation pursuing pleasure."
PS: O texto é sobre como os conservadores não podem deixar barato que sua "derrota" interna dentro do Partido Republicano para John Mcain, os faça a não apoiar o "menor dos males" e deixe espaço para os "liberais" Democratas voltarem a Casa Branca.
sexta-feira, fevereiro 08, 2008
The Economist e o Bolsa Familia
A The Economist dessa semana traz uma matéria com mais informação, cor local e tratamento balanceado, sobre o Bolsa Família que 90% das bobagens produzidas sobre o programa. Altamente elogiosa, ela desmonta mitos que entraram na cabeça de muita gente por pressão de quem é contra o combate à miséria. São traduzidas dessa maneira: a de que o programa "vicia" ao "dar o peixe e não ensinar a pescar". A de que o programa não tem "portas de saída", e a de que o programa é "caro" e "eleitoreiro". Na realidade, o Bolsa Família só é uma vantagem eleitoral para Lula porque seus adversários o combatem ao invés de adotá-lo como um "consenso" (sic), como Lula fez com a ortodoxia econômica, tirando o "chão" do PSDB. Segue o link para o texto integral (em inglês) e abaixo dele a desmontagem desses mitos.
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10650663
Despite the early success of Bolsa Família, three concerns remain. The first is over fraud. Because money is paid directly to the beneficiary's debit card, there is little scope for leakage. The question is whether local governments are collecting accurate data on eligibility and enforcing the conditions. Some 15% of municipal councils make the improbable claim that 100% of pupils are in school 100% of the time. Despite this, most of the money does go to the right people: 70% ends up in the pockets of the poorest 20% of families, the World Bank finds.
Second, some people worry that Bolsa Família will end up as a permanent feature of Brazilian society, rather than a temporary boost aimed at changing the opportunities available to the poorest. Whether this happens will depend largely on whether Brazil's public schools improve fast enough to give all their new pupils a reasonable education. Since the scheme began on a large scale only in 2003, it is still too early to tell.
Third, Bolsa Família is sometimes equated with straightforward vote-buying. That is unfair. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's name is strongly associated with the scheme—even among some people in Alagoas who are unaware that he is Brazil's president. But their gratitude does not extend to support for his Workers' Party. There are signs that mayors who administer the programme well get a reward at the polls while those who do not suffer. For a relatively modest outlay (0.8% of GDP), Brazil is getting a good return. If only the same could be said of the rest of what the government spends.
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10650663
Despite the early success of Bolsa Família, three concerns remain. The first is over fraud. Because money is paid directly to the beneficiary's debit card, there is little scope for leakage. The question is whether local governments are collecting accurate data on eligibility and enforcing the conditions. Some 15% of municipal councils make the improbable claim that 100% of pupils are in school 100% of the time. Despite this, most of the money does go to the right people: 70% ends up in the pockets of the poorest 20% of families, the World Bank finds.
Second, some people worry that Bolsa Família will end up as a permanent feature of Brazilian society, rather than a temporary boost aimed at changing the opportunities available to the poorest. Whether this happens will depend largely on whether Brazil's public schools improve fast enough to give all their new pupils a reasonable education. Since the scheme began on a large scale only in 2003, it is still too early to tell.
Third, Bolsa Família is sometimes equated with straightforward vote-buying. That is unfair. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's name is strongly associated with the scheme—even among some people in Alagoas who are unaware that he is Brazil's president. But their gratitude does not extend to support for his Workers' Party. There are signs that mayors who administer the programme well get a reward at the polls while those who do not suffer. For a relatively modest outlay (0.8% of GDP), Brazil is getting a good return. If only the same could be said of the rest of what the government spends.
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